Are government ministers more likely to be re-elected? Evidence from Papua New Guinea

Abstract

Being a government minister is often seen as providing a resource and reputational advantage for parliamentarians running for re-election. Using a difference-indifferences event study approach, I find that being a minister increases the likelihood that an incumbent parliamentarian wins at the next election by 14.4 percentage points in open (district-level) electorates in Papua New Guinea (PNG). This ministerial incumbency effect dissipates within one election cycle, even if the parliamentarian continues to hold ministerial office. Substantial heterogeneity however exists across types of electoral seats and ministerial portfolios. There appears to be no effect for ministers running for reelection in provincial electoral seats covering multiple districts, likely reflecting the effects of a law governing ministerial office in PNG. The magnitude and direction of the ministerial incumbency effect also differs according to the type of ministry, with economic and central agency portfolios providing substantially greater electoral benefits than more junior ministerial positions.

Keywords: Politics, Political science, Incumbency, Incumbency effects, Ministerial incumbency effects, Government, Government ministers, Political economy, Papua New Guinea, Pacific, Pacific Island Countries, Pacific Island Region, Pacific politics

JEL Classification: P00, P10, P19