Unveiling Lies in Disguise: A Test of Lying Aversion Theories

45 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2024

See all articles by JunYi Peng-Zhou

JunYi Peng-Zhou

Dongbei University of Finance and Economics - Institute for Advanced Economic Research

Jin-yeong Sohn

Dongbei University of Finance and Economics - Institute for Advanced Economic Research

Xu Cheng

Dongbei University of Finance and Economics

Abstract

We provide an experimental test to distinguish two prominent theories of lying aver- sion: perceived cheating aversion (Dufwenberg & Dufwenberg 2018) and reputation for honesty (Gneezy et al. 2018, Khalmetski & Sliwka 2019). We use a novel belief-elicitation method, which allows us to estimate the subjects’ strategies, i.e. probability of reporting y ∈ {1,··· ,6} conditional on die roll x ∈ {1,··· ,6}. We also compare lying behav- ior across various non-linear payoff schemes. Our results support no-downward-lies and uniform-cheating properties proposed by Dufwenberg & Dufwenberg (2018). We find par- tial support for an implication of reputation for honesty; people use maximal lies more (less) frequently under a convex (concave) payoff scheme.

Keywords: Perceived cheating aversion, lying, convexity of payoffs, die-roll paradigm, cheating game

Suggested Citation

Peng-Zhou, JunYi and Sohn, Jin-yeong and Cheng, Xu, Unveiling Lies in Disguise: A Test of Lying Aversion Theories. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5051895 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5051895

JunYi Peng-Zhou

Dongbei University of Finance and Economics - Institute for Advanced Economic Research ( email )

217 Jianshan Street
Dalian, Liaoning 116025
China

Jin-yeong Sohn (Contact Author)

Dongbei University of Finance and Economics - Institute for Advanced Economic Research ( email )

217 Jianshan Street
Dalian, Liaoning 116025
China

Xu Cheng

Dongbei University of Finance and Economics ( email )

China

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
32
Abstract Views
147
PlumX Metrics