The Crowding-Out Effect of Cause-Marketing on Private Donations

50 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2025

See all articles by Nishita Sinha

Nishita Sinha

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Marco A. Palma

Texas A&M University; Texas A&M University

Richard T. Woodward

Texas A&M University - Department of Agricultural Economics

Abstract

We extend the altruism and warm-glow models of charitable giving to incorporate cause marketing, where firms pledge to donate a fixed portion of sales proceeds for each unit of consumer goods sold. Using a general utility framework, we show that under cause-marketing, complete crowding-out is realizable for both pure and impure altruists. We conduct an artefactual field experiment where participants decide between allocating their endowment toward buying donation-tied tokens and directly donating to an individualized charity. We test for cause-marketing charitable giving motivations by varying the source of third-party donations between an exogenous lump-sum transfer and an endogenous transfer that indirectly accrues via private consumption. Our results suggest that on average, cause-marketing contributions arising from private token consumption lead to as much warm-glow utility as direct contributions to the charity.

Keywords: cause-marketing, artefactual field experiment, pure altruism, warm glow

Suggested Citation

Sinha, Nishita and Palma, Marco A. and Woodward, Richard T., The Crowding-Out Effect of Cause-Marketing on Private Donations. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5204220 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5204220

Nishita Sinha (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Marco A. Palma

Texas A&M University

2124 TAMU
1500 Research Parkway
College Station, TX Texas 77843
United States

Texas A&M University

2124 TAMU
1500 Research Parkway
College Station, TX Texas 77843-3137
United States

Richard T. Woodward

Texas A&M University - Department of Agricultural Economics ( email )

College Station, TX 77843-4218
United States
(409) 845-5864 (Phone)

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