Dismantling Financial Oversight: Implications of CFPB Downsizing for Regulatory Integrity and Market Stability

29 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2025

Date Written: April 21, 2025

Abstract

This paper examines the long-term implications of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB) downsizing under the second Trump administration. Originally created in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis to centralize consumer protection, the CFPB has seen its workforce and regulatory scope dramatically reduced. This shift has curtailed oversight in critical sectors, including student lending, medical debt, and fintech. Drawing on historical and international comparisons, this paper evaluates the risks of regulatory fragmentation, consumer harm, and systemic vulnerabilities arising from this retrenchment. It explores the limitations of relying on state agencies, industry self-regulation, and private litigation to fill the enforcement void. The analysis underscores the normative and structural challenges facing modern consumer financial regulation in a digitized, data-driven economy. The paper concludes by assessing reform options, including international models of regulatory independence and embedded consumer protection. These insights aim to inform policymakers, legal scholars, and financial regulators navigating a rapidly evolving oversight landscape.

Keywords: CFPB, consumer protection, financial regulation, fintech oversight, deregulatory policy, algorithmic lending

JEL Classification: G18, G28, K23, D18, H83, L51, O38

Suggested Citation

Krause, David, Dismantling Financial Oversight: Implications of CFPB Downsizing for Regulatory Integrity and Market Stability (April 21, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5224825 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5224825

David Krause (Contact Author)

Marquette University ( email )

College of Business Administration
P.O. Box 1881
Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
73
Abstract Views
384
Rank
716,017
PlumX Metrics