Social Learning in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs)

60 Pages Posted: 27 May 2025 Last revised: 6 Jun 2025

See all articles by Eric F. Buddensiek

Eric F. Buddensiek

Technische Universität München (TUM)

Paul P. Momtaz

Syracuse University - Whitman School of Management; Technische Universität München (TUM) - TUM School of Management

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Date Written: May 17, 2025

Abstract

We document social learning in the form of information cascades in proposals put up for vote in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). Exploring hand-collected data covering 19,450,710 votes from 924,095 unique voters in 3,317 DAO governance proposals, we identify economically strong information cascades that run from influential through early to late voters. Several contextual factors impede social learning in DAOs, including the presence of cybercriminals in the DAO community and market sentiment, while the decentralization of token ownership is an important prerequisite for information cascades to unfold. Finally, we establish a link between the potency of information cascades and the financial performance of DAOs. Stronger information cascades are associated with higher market capitalization, trading volume, and abnormal cryptocurrency token returns. Overall, our study shows how decentralized digital communities coordinate to create economic value in entrepreneurial settings.

Keywords: Social learning, information cascades, decentralized autonomous organization (DAO)

Suggested Citation

Buddensiek, Eric F. and Momtaz, Paul P., Social Learning in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) (May 17, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5258152 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5258152

Eric F. Buddensiek

Technische Universität München (TUM) ( email )

Paul P. Momtaz (Contact Author)

Syracuse University - Whitman School of Management ( email )

721 University Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13244-2130
United States

Technische Universität München (TUM) - TUM School of Management ( email )

Arcisstr. 21
Munich, 80333
Germany

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