Nonfinancial Disclosure Mandates and Private Lending

58 Pages Posted: 30 May 2025 Last revised: 30 May 2025

See all articles by Zhaoran Gong

Zhaoran Gong

Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU) - International Business School Suzhou

Zhehao Jia

The University of Edinburgh - Business School

Donghui Li

Shenzhen University

Date Written: October 28, 2024

Abstract

Utilizing the staggered implementation of environmental and social (E&S) disclosure mandates in 31 countries spanning from 2000 to 2017, we discover that lenders charge (approximately 18 basis points) less on bank loans and stipulate less restricted loan contract terms when the borrower’s country is subject to E&S information disclosure mandates. The negative relationship between E&S disclosure mandates and bank loan costs is more pronounced among loan facilities with pre-existing bank lending relationships or when borrowers face greater market attention. Further analysis shows that better country-level information environments strengthen this negative impact of E&S disclosure mandates. Our study suggests that non-financial ESG disclosure not only mitigates information asymmetries in private lending but also significantly reduces the cost of capital worldwide.

Keywords: ESG disclosure, private lending, environmental and social disclosure, bank lending relationship, information environment

Suggested Citation

Gong, Zhaoran and Jia, Zhehao and Li, Donghui, Nonfinancial Disclosure Mandates and Private Lending (October 28, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5275629 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5275629

Zhaoran Gong

Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU) - International Business School Suzhou ( email )

111 Ren'ai Road
Suzhou Industrial Park
Suzhou, Jiangsu 215123
China

Zhehao Jia (Contact Author)

The University of Edinburgh - Business School ( email )

29 Buccleuch Pl
Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9JS
United Kingdom

Donghui Li

Shenzhen University ( email )

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