Download This PaperFamily Control and the Rent-Seeking Society
49 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2004
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Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society
Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society
Date Written: June 2003
Abstract
The small number of very large family-controlled corporate groups in many countries combined with their long continuity of control and ability to act discretely give these organizations a comparative advantage in political rent-seeking. This advantage is a key part of a self-reinforcing system whereby oligarchic family corporate control, political rent seeking, and low general levels of trust combine to stymie growth.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Randall K. Morck (Contact Author)
University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis ( email )
2-32C Business Building
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
780-492-5683 (Phone)
780-492-3325 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium
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