Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs
CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-84
10 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2005
Date Written: July 2005
Abstract
Recently a variety of link-based stability concepts have emerged in the literature on game theoretic models of social network formation. We investigate two basic formation properties that establish equivalence between some well known types of stable networks and their natural extensions. These properties can be identified as convexity conditions on the network payoff structures.
Keywords: Social networks, network formation, pairwise stability
JEL Classification: C72, C79
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Gilles, Robert P. and Sarangi, Sudipta, Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs (July 2005). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-84, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=795388 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.795388
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN