Sovereign Risk: Constitutions Rule

Oxford Economic Papers (forthcoming)

50 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2005 Last revised: 28 Aug 2009

See all articles by Emanuel Kohlscheen

Emanuel Kohlscheen

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 1, 2004

Abstract

This paper models the executive's choice of whether to reschedule external debt as the outcome of an intra-governmental negotiation process. The executive's necessity of a confidence vote from the legislature is found to provide the rationale for why some democracies may not renegotiate their foreign obligations. Empirically, parliamentary democracies are indeed less prone to reschedule their foreign liabilities or accumulate arrears on them. Most of the democracies that have been able to significantly reduce their debt/GNP ratio without a 'credit incident' were parliamentary. Moreover, countries with stronger political checks on the executive and lower executive turnover have a lower rescheduling propensity. These results suggest that North and Weingast's account of the evolution of institutions in 17th century England gives substantial mileage in understanding the international debt markets in the contemporary developing world.

Keywords: debt, crises, parliamentary, commitment, sovereign, risk, constitutions, serial default, political institutions, confidence

JEL Classification: D72, F30, F34

Suggested Citation

Kohlscheen, Emanuel, Sovereign Risk: Constitutions Rule (May 1, 2004). Oxford Economic Papers (forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=814586 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.814586

Emanuel Kohlscheen (Contact Author)

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) ( email )

Centralbahnplatz 2
Basel, Basel-Stadt 4002
Switzerland

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