Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Two Simple Single-Profile Versions

Brown University Department of Economics Working Paper No. 2006-11

27 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2006

See all articles by Allan M. Feldman

Allan M. Feldman

Brown University - Department of Economics

Roberto Serrano

Brown University

Date Written: March 5, 2008

Abstract

In this paper we provide two simple new versions of Arrow's impossibility theorem, in a model with only one preference profile. Both versions are transparent, requiring minimal mathematical sophistication. The first version assumes there are only two people in society, whose preferences are being aggregated; the second version assumes two or more people. Both theorems rely on assumptions about diversity of preferences, and we explore alternative notions of diversity at some length. Our first theorem also uses a neutrality assumption, commonly used in the literature; our second theorem uses a neutrality/monotonicity assumption, which is stronger and less commonly used. We provide examples to illustrate our points.

Keywords: Arrow's theorem, single-profile

JEL Classification: D60, D70, D71

Suggested Citation

Feldman, Allan M. and Serrano, Roberto, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Two Simple Single-Profile Versions (March 5, 2008). Brown University Department of Economics Working Paper No. 2006-11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=896742 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.896742

Allan M. Feldman (Contact Author)

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-2415 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

Roberto Serrano

Brown University ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-1036 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

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