The Virtuous Cycle of Property

Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 103, No. 3, pp. 413-427, 2021

47 Pages Posted: 9 May 2019 Last revised: 18 Jun 2019

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Marco Fabbri

University Pompeu Fabra, Department of Business and Economics; University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)

Date Written: April 10, 2019

Abstract

We show that formalizing private property rights has a positive effect on the propensity to respect the property of others, a social preference with important implications for growth and economic development. Our identification strategy is based on a unique feature of a recent large-scale land-tenure reform in West Africa, which was the first of its kind to be implemented as a randomized control trial. To recover the effect of the reform on subjects' willingness to respect others' property, we used a lab-in-the-field experiment in which subjects played a modified dictator game designed to elicit their willingness to appropriate others' endowment. Results show that the formalization of private property rights reduced an individual's willingness to take from others. We used additional experimental measures and post-experimental survey data to rule out alternative explanations for the observed behavior that do not imply a change in preferences. These findings suggest that the structure and design of property rights institutions play a key role in shaping prosocial preferences.

Keywords: respect for property, anti-taking preferences, property reform, prosocial preferences

JEL Classification: D02; D04; K11

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Fabbri, Marco, The Virtuous Cycle of Property (April 10, 2019). Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 103, No. 3, pp. 413-427, 2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3369850 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3369850

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Postbus 15654
1001 ND
Amsterdam, Noord-Holland 1001 ND
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Marco Fabbri (Contact Author)

University Pompeu Fabra, Department of Business and Economics ( email )

Barcelona
Spain

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

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