ESG Investing: What Shareholders Do Fund Managers Represent?

14 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2022

See all articles by Stephen Haber

Stephen Haber

Stanford University - Hoover Institution and Political Science

John D. Kepler

Stanford Graduate School of Business

David F. Larcker

Stanford Graduate School of Business; Stanford University - Hoover Institution; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Amit Seru

Stanford University

Brian Tayan

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Date Written: November 3, 2022

Abstract

In this Closer Look, we examine individual investor perception of ESG to gauge their concern for environmental and social issues, their view of whether fund managers should use their voting power to influence ESG practices, and their willingness to sacrifice return in the advancement of ESG objectives. We find that investors are not homogenous in their viewpoints and demonstrate significant divergence based on age and wealth, with the most vulnerable investors—those who are older and those with low levels of savings—largely opposed to ESG and unwilling to risk their assets to advance these objectives, in contrast to younger, wealthy investors who are much more supportive and willing to forfeit returns. Significant differences in perception of ESG also exist within and across fund companies. The results suggest that fund managers should consider the various viewpoints of their investor base and potentially split their votes on controversial ESG-related proxy proposals to reflect the divergent interests of beneficial owners.

We ask:
• How do fund managers determine how to vote shares regarding ESG-related proxy proposals?
• How rigorous is the analysis they perform regarding the economic impact of these proposals?
• How do fund managers balance the interests of their investor base when these interests diverge?
• Would split voting improve mutual fund governance by protecting the interest of minority voters—whether that minority is in favor of or opposed to ESG?

Keywords: Corporate governance, ESG, environmental, social, governance, sustainability, socially responsible investing, corporate responsibility, sustainability, ESG ratings, ESG initiatives, individual investors, mutual fund investors, exchange traded funds, willingness to forfeit returns, Millennials, Gener

Suggested Citation

Haber, Stephen H. and Kepler, John and Larcker, David F. and Seru, Amit and Tayan, Brian, ESG Investing: What Shareholders Do Fund Managers Represent? (November 3, 2022). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper Forthcoming, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 4267270, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4267270

Stephen H. Haber (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Hoover Institution and Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

John Kepler

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

David F. Larcker

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

Graduate School of Business
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-725-6159 (Phone)

Stanford University - Hoover Institution ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Amit Seru

Stanford University ( email )

367 Panama St
Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Brian Tayan

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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