Reason Defaults: Presenting Defaults With Reasons for Choosing Each Option Helps Decision Makers With Minority Interests

35 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2023

See all articles by Shweta Desiraju

Shweta Desiraju

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Berkeley J. Dietvorst

University of Chicago - Marketing Management

Date Written: July 26, 2023

Abstract

Defaults are powerful tools for nudging individuals towards potentially beneficial options. However, defaults typically guide all decision-makers towards the same option, and consequently, may misguide individuals with minority interests. We test whether presenting defaults with information about heterogeneity can help individuals with minority interests select alternative options, and dub this intervention a “reason default.” Reason defaults pre-select the option that is best for most individuals (like standard defaults), but also explain 1) why the default was selected and 2) who should opt for an alternative. In five preregistered studies using online convenience samples of adults (N=4,210) we find that reason defaults can improve decision-makers’ outcomes over standard defaults and forced choices by guiding most individuals towards the default option, while helping individuals with minority interests select an alternative. Further, participants reported that reason defaults enhance transparency, decision ease, and understanding of the choice relative to standard defaults and forced choices.

Keywords: defaults, choice architecture, heterogeneity, transparency, nudge

Suggested Citation

Desiraju, Shweta and Dietvorst, Berkeley, Reason Defaults: Presenting Defaults With Reasons for Choosing Each Option Helps Decision Makers With Minority Interests (July 26, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4521908 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4521908

Shweta Desiraju

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S Woodlawn Ave
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Berkeley Dietvorst (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Marketing Management ( email )

Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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