Do Individualists and Collectivists Cooperate Differently?

44 Pages Posted: 30 Oct 2023 Last revised: 13 Nov 2024

See all articles by Aidin Hajikhameneh

Aidin Hajikhameneh

San Jose State University

Erik O. Kimbrough

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros College of Business and Economics; Chapman University - Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy

Brock Stoddard

Appalachian State University

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Abstract

Do cultural mindsets shape cooperation? Individualists, who view people as independent, and collectivists, who see them as interconnected, make different decisions that impact governance and economic outcomes. This study tests individualism and collectivism (I/C) in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas (IRPD) among in- and out-group members. We hypothesized that collectivists would cooperate more with in-group members, while individualists would treat all groups similarly. To explore causality, participants completed a group-identity task before the I/C measure in Strong-Identity treatment, but not in Weak-Identity treatment. Results show largely null I/C effects; only higher defection payoffs consistently reduced cooperation.

Keywords: individualism, collectivism, repeated games, experiments, cooperation

Suggested Citation

Hajikhameneh, Aidin and Kimbrough, Erik O. and Stoddard, Brock, Do Individualists and Collectivists Cooperate Differently?. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4617736 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4617736

Aidin Hajikhameneh

San Jose State University ( email )

San Jose, CA 95192
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/aidinhajikhameneh/home

Erik O. Kimbrough (Contact Author)

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros College of Business and Economics ( email )

One University Dr
Orange, CA 92866
United States

Chapman University - Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy ( email )

One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States

Brock Stoddard

Appalachian State University ( email )

Boone, NC 28608
United States

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