Employer and Employee Responses to Generative AI: Early Evidence

93 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2024 Last revised: 5 Jul 2026

See all articles by Philip G. Berger

Philip G. Berger

University of Chicago - Chookaszian Accounting Research Center

Wei Cai

Columbia Business School

Lin Qiu

Purdue University

Cindy Xinyi Shen

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Date Written: February 01, 2024

Abstract

We examine the early responses of employers and employees to Generative AI through the lens of classic management accounting theories. Our framework uses three dimensions of organizational architecture: organizational orientation, technological capacity, and occupational autonomy. On the employer side, we find evidence of both displacement and augmentation effects: firms with greater GenAI exposure reduce hiring while increasingly emphasizing GenAI-related skills in job postings. On the employee side, workers show a decline in their long-term outlook for the firm. Cross-sectional analyses further show that hiring declines are larger in firms with more coercive control systems, that GenAI skill demand increases more in jobs with higher innovation and independence, and that negative employee sentiment is more pronounced in firms with coercive orientations and greater technological capacity. Our results reveal a mismatch between adaptive employer responses and employees’ more negative reactions, and thus have implications for management control design in an era of intelligent automation.

Keywords: GenAI, Employer and Employee, Management Accounting, Organizational Control

Suggested Citation

Berger, Philip G. and Cai, Wei and Qiu, Lin and Shen, Cindy Xinyi, Employer and Employee Responses to Generative AI: Early Evidence (February 01, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4874061 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4874061

Philip G. Berger

University of Chicago - Chookaszian Accounting Research Center ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637-1561
United States

Wei Cai (Contact Author)

Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Lin Qiu

Purdue University ( email )

403 W State Street
West Lafayette, IN Indiana 47907
United States

Cindy Xinyi Shen

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

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