Measuring Norms: Eliciting normative expectations with Krupka and Weber's method allowing for neutral reports

97 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2025 Last revised: 7 Apr 2026

See all articles by Diego Aycinena

Diego Aycinena

University of Pennsylvania

Francesco Bogliacino

Università degli Studi di Bergamo

Erik O. Kimbrough

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros College of Business and Economics; Chapman University - Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy

Date Written: January 26, 2026

Abstract

This study examines whether adding a neutral category improves Krupka-Weber’s (2013) coordination game approach for eliciting normative expectations. The standard four-item scale lacks a neutral midpoint, potentially obscuring asymmetries in deviations from prescribed actions and forcing expression of normative valence, even when absent. In experiments using dictator games and vignettes, we introduce a neutral option. This addition neither serves as a source of focality -originally a concern for coordination-based methods nor distorts responses, and remains robust when combined with incentivized uncertainty response options. Including it slightly reduces bias and noise in predicting behavior, enhancing precision and interpretability without introducing drawbacks. 

Keywords: social norms, normative expectations, focal points, coordination, neutral, experimental methods

JEL Classification: A13, C91, D01, D63, D83, D91

Suggested Citation

Aycinena, Diego and Bogliacino, Francesco and Kimbrough, Erik O., Measuring Norms: Eliciting normative expectations with Krupka and Weber's method allowing for neutral reports (January 26, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5050953 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5050953

Diego Aycinena

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

3718 Locust Walk
McNeil building, #445
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.diegoaycinena.com

Francesco Bogliacino

Università degli Studi di Bergamo ( email )

Via dei Caniana
2
Bergamo, Bergamo 24127
Italy

Erik O. Kimbrough (Contact Author)

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros College of Business and Economics ( email )

One University Dr
Orange, CA 92866
United States

Chapman University - Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy ( email )

One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States

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