Monetizing Platform Markets: Channel Structure and In-Game Advertiser Presence in Two-Sided Markets *

30 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2025 Last revised: 4 Jan 2026

See all articles by Qihong Liu

Qihong Liu

University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics

Liangfei Qiu

University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration

Bo Shen

Wuhan University

Date Written: December 31, 2025

Abstract

Recent shifts in the video game console industry point to a growing reliance on ad-supported monetization models alongside traditional hardware and software sales. Major platform owners are exploring in-game advertising across consoles, mobile, and cloud environments, while hardware continues to be sold through physical retailers. This emerging configuration raises new strategic questions about how distribution channels and advertiser participation interact. Building on this industry context, this paper examines the strategic interplay between channel structure and the presence of advertisers in a two-sided market where one side consists of users and the other of advertisers. We compare outcomes under two channel structures-a platform selling directly to users or through a downstream retailer-and explore how the introduction of advertisers affects equilibrium outcomes across these structures. Conversely, we investigate how the platform's distribution channel affects equilibrium outcomes depending on whether the advertising side exists. Several interesting results emerge. In a one-sided market without advertisers, introducing a retailer consistently raises the retail price, reduces industry profit, and lowers social welfare due to double marginalization. However, in the presence of advertisers, while the introduction of a retailer still reduces industry profit, it can lower the retail price and increase social welfare. Similarly, when a retailer is already present, adding the advertiser side as a new source of revenue does not necessarily benefit the platform once the retailer's strategic response is accounted for. Our analysis reveals conditions under which advertiser presence and channel structure reinforce or counteract each other, offering new insights into platform design and multi-sided pricing strategies.

Keywords: Two-Sided Platforms, Ad-Supported Monetization, Channel Structure, Vertical Integration

Suggested Citation

Liu, Qihong and Qiu, Liangfei and Shen, Bo, Monetizing Platform Markets: Channel Structure and In-Game Advertiser Presence in Two-Sided Markets * (December 31, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5953777 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5953777

Qihong Liu (Contact Author)

University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics ( email )

Norman, OK 73019-2103
United States
405-325-5846 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://qliu.oucreate.com

Liangfei Qiu

University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration ( email )

Gainesville, FL 32611
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/qiuliangfei/

Bo Shen

Wuhan University ( email )

Wuhan University
Economics and Management School
Wuhan, Hubei 430072
China

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
71
Abstract Views
254
Rank
916,100
PlumX Metrics