Banks as Stewards

48 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2026

See all articles by Kristian Blickle

Kristian Blickle

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Adair Morse

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Parinitha Sastry

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department

Date Written: March 27, 2026

Abstract

Banks may play a more active role in corporate finance than previously documented. We document that banks hire industry experts and then steward firms to undertake investments in expansion (new to the firm) sectors.  In supervisory data including detailed regulatory risk measures and granular loan-level industry attribution, expansion loans are double as likely to emerge in bank-firm potential pairs when the bank has precise industry specialization or higher degree experts. Results are robust to specifications that build off dynamic comparables strategies (Sun and Abraham, 2021), `within-firm' (Khwaja and Mian, 2008}) and `within-bank'  (Blickle et al., 2024) analyses, and fully saturated bank-firm-time models (Paravisini et al., 2023). Conceptualizing our setting, we frame that bank stewarding will be more prevalent where firms neglect expansion investment because of high discount rates. Empirically, the effect of bank expertise and specialization unlocking expansion loans is increasing in firms' short-termist discount rates.  Finally, we document the mechanism through loan pricing:  banks provide loans at 7-to-72 bps lower interest rates to induce loan volume, and thereby overcoming Kodak moments. Such expansion stewarding is likely most valuable in moments of transition for an industry.  We corroborate our general expansion evidence in the context of firm expansion investments from the energy transition.  Active bank stewarding moves the literature beyond the classic view of banks as mere credit providers.

Suggested Citation

Blickle, Kristian and Morse, Adair and Sastry, Parinitha, Banks as Stewards (March 27, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6481418

Kristian Blickle

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

Adair Morse

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Parinitha Sastry (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )

The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

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