Does Banking Consolidation Harm Households?

61 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2026 Last revised: 30 Apr 2026

See all articles by Celso Brunetti

Celso Brunetti

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Jeffrey H. Harris

American University - Department of Finance and Real Estate

Ioannis Spyridopoulos

American University, Kogod School of Business

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Date Written: April 10, 2026

Abstract

No. Using confidential micro-level data combining mortgage contracts with credit and repayment records for 44 million loans spanning 5,000 bank mergers over nearly three decades, we find no changes to mortgage rates, approval rates, or delinquency rates. Local mortgage markets remain remarkably competitive despite consolidation, averaging over 100 active lenders in each county every post-merger quarter. Our findings reveal significant merger selection motives: large acquiring banks target community banks with relationship-intensive, portfolio-lending business models, whereas community banks appear to merge together to gain scale and compete. Overall, our study challenges the view that bank mergers increase market concentration and create market power that harms household borrowers.

Suggested Citation

Brunetti, Celso and Harris, Jeffrey H. and Spyridopoulos, Ioannis, Does Banking Consolidation Harm Households? (April 10, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6556342 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6556342

Celso Brunetti

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Jeffrey H. Harris

American University - Department of Finance and Real Estate ( email )

Kogod School of Business
4400 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8044
United States
202-885-6669 (Phone)

Ioannis Spyridopoulos (Contact Author)

American University, Kogod School of Business ( email )

4400 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20016
United States

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