Teacher Preferences, Working Conditions, and Compensation Structure

48 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2020 Last revised: 6 May 2025

See all articles by Andrew C. Johnston

Andrew C. Johnston

University of Texas at Austin - College of Liberal Arts; University of California, Merced - Department of Economics

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Abstract

Improving schools depends on attracting high-caliber teachers and increasing retention, both made possible by appealing to teacher preferences. I deploy a discrete-choice experiment in a setting where teachers have reason to reveal their preferences. There are three main findings: (1) I calculate willingness-to-pay for a series of workplace attributes including salary structure, retirement benefits, performance pay, class size, and time-to-tenure. (2) Highly rated teachers have stronger preferences for schools offering performance pay, which may be used to differentially attract and retain them. (3) Under various criteria, schools seem to underpay in salary and performance pay while overpaying in retirement benefits.

Keywords: retention, achievement, labor market, teachers, selection

JEL Classification: I20, J32, J45, M50

Suggested Citation

Johnston, Andrew C., Teacher Preferences, Working Conditions, and Compensation Structure. IZA Discussion Paper No. 13121, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3573291

Andrew C. Johnston (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - College of Liberal Arts ( email )

Austin, TX
United States

University of California, Merced - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 2039
Merced, CA 95344
United States

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