Social Framing and Cooperation: The Roles and Interaction of Preferences and Beliefs

26 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2015

See all articles by Elizabeth Bernold

Elizabeth Bernold

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology

Elisabeth Gsottbauer

Institute of Public Finance, Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck

Kurt A. Ackermann

ETH Zürich - Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences (GESS)

Ryan O. Murphy

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 30, 2015

Abstract

Evidence suggests that there are substantial and systematic differences in cooperation rates under varying framing conditions in social dilemmas. Several explanations of these differences have been presented. Some (e.g. McCusker and Carnevale, 1995; van Dijk and Wilke, 2000) argue that social frames mainly cause subjects’ preferences to change, while others (e.g. Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Ellingsen et al., 2012) argue that frame-specific terminology, such as the name of the game, mainly affects subjects’ beliefs about others’ behavior, which in turn affects their own behavior. This paper advances the discussion concerning the role of frames in social dilemmas by simultaneously identifying the effects framing has on both preferences and beliefs with the same players and within the same experiment. The current experiment employes a design in which the same interaction was labeled differently, such that the interaction was referred to as a Community Game, a Wall Street Game, an Environment Game, or simply as a Game in the control condition. In all four experimental conditions, we measured the subjects’ (i) social preferences, (ii) cooperative behavior and beliefs in a one-shot public goods game with the strategy method, (iii) cooperative behavior and beliefs in a ten-round iterated public goods game with random group rematching, and (iv) donation decisions to a naturally occurring public good. Overall, our results show that preferences, as well as beliefs, are both significant predictors of cooperation decisions, and that framing has significant effects on these two predictors’ relative weights and also on aggregate cooperation rates. However, the impact of framing on cooperative behavior is complicated, and our results indicate that the magnitude and direction of framing effects may depend on diverse and subtle context-dependent mechanisms that are not yet fully understood.

Keywords: Cooperation, Framing, Public Goods Games, Social preferences, Social value orientation (SVO)

JEL Classification: C72, C91, D63, D64, H41

Suggested Citation

Bernold, Elizabeth and Gsottbauer, Elisabeth and Ackermann, Kurt Alexander and Murphy, Ryan O., Social Framing and Cooperation: The Roles and Interaction of Preferences and Beliefs (January 30, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2557927 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2557927

Elizabeth Bernold

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology ( email )

ETH-Zentrum SEW E 26
CH-8092 Zurich, Zurich 8006
Switzerland

Elisabeth Gsottbauer

Institute of Public Finance, Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck ( email )

Universitätsstrasse 15
Innsbruck, 6020
Austria

Kurt Alexander Ackermann (Contact Author)

ETH Zürich - Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences (GESS) ( email )

Clausiusstrasse 50
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland
++41 632 91 85 (Phone)

Ryan O. Murphy

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zürich
Switzerland

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
376
Abstract Views
2,224
Rank
173,048
PlumX Metrics