via Cintia
Complesso Monte S.Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Department of Economic and Statistical Sciences, Univesity of Naples Federico II
Dynamic Matching, One-sided Market, Stability, Dynamic Core, Intertemporal Top Trading Cycle
Dynamic Matching, One-sided Market, Core, Stability, Rational Expectations, Dynamic Core
Matching, Core, Pareto-efficiency, Strategy-proofness
Strategy-proofness, Group Separability, Condorcet Winner, Lexicographical Preferences
Sharing Services, Matching Theory, Utilitarian Welfare, Rawlsian Welfare
Generalized Lexicographic Preferences, Group Separability, Strategy-proofnes, Voting by Committees, Condorcet Winner
Dynamic Matching, Stability, Rationalizability
Stable Matching, Welfare Maximization, Strategy-Proofness, AssignmentGame, Division Problem.
D70, D71, D78 Collective choice correspondences, neutrality, pairwise justifiability, serial dictatorship