How to Save Globalization from its Cheerleaders

34 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2007

See all articles by Dani Rodrik

Dani Rodrik

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: September 2007

Abstract

The new conventional wisdom on globalization emphasizes that reaping the benefits of trade and financial integration is not automatic, and requires better domestic institutions, essentially improved safety nets in rich countries and improved governance in the poor countries. The prevailing strategy is predicated on the presumption that insufficiently open markets continue to pose an important constraint on the world economy. In reality, lack of openness is no longer the binding constraint for the global economy. The gains to be reaped by further liberalization of markets are meager for poor and rich countries alike. An alternative approach to globalization would focus on enhancing policy space rather than market access, and on devising the rules of the game to better manage the interface between national regulatory and social regimes. It is possible to envisage such rules without slipping back into protectionism.

Keywords: Economics - International Economics, International Development

Suggested Citation

Rodrik, Dani, How to Save Globalization from its Cheerleaders (September 2007). KSG Working Paper No. RWP07-038. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1019015 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1019015

Dani Rodrik (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-9454 (Phone)
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HOME PAGE: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/rodrik/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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