Capital Market Competitiveness and Enforcement

10 Pages Posted: 2 May 2008  

Eilis Ferran

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: April 2008

Abstract

Recent scholarship has suggested that enforcement intensity may impinge significantly on capital market competitiveness. This paper examines this proposition in the context of the UK FSA's approach to oversight and enforcement in respect of insider dealing and other forms of market abuse.

Keywords: capital markets, competitiveness; insider dealing; market abuse; UK public enforcement

JEL Classification: G18, G28, G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Ferran, Eilis, Capital Market Competitiveness and Enforcement (April 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1127245 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1127245

Eilis Ferran (Contact Author)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom
+ 44 1223 338335 (Phone)
+ 44 1223 338340 (Fax)

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