Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India

45 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2008

See all articles by Timothy J. Besley

Timothy J. Besley

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Rohini Pande

Yale University - Economic Growth Center

Vijayendra Rao

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2005

Abstract

This paper uses household data from India to examine the economic and social status of village politicians, and how individual and village characteristics a®ect politician behavior while in o±ce. Education increases the chances of selection to public o±ce and reduces the odds that a politician uses political power opportunistically. In contrast, land ownership and political connections enable selection but do not a®ect politician opportunism. At the village level, changes in the identity of the politically dominant group alters the group allocation of resources but not politician opportunism. Improved information °ows in the village, however, reduce opportunism and improve resource allocation.

JEL Classification: I21, O15

Suggested Citation

Besley, Timothy J. and Pande, Rohini and Rao, Vijayendra, Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India (August 2005). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. PEPP08. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1158330

Timothy J. Besley (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 6702 (Phone)
+44 20 7955 6951 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Rohini Pande

Yale University - Economic Growth Center ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, CT 06520-8269
United States

Vijayendra Rao

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-458-8034 (Phone)
202-522-1153 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://vijayendrarao.org

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
42
Abstract Views
634
PlumX Metrics