Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe - Part II

68 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2008 Last revised: 13 Jan 2015

See all articles by Eric J. Pan

Eric J. Pan

Columbia University - Center for Law and Economic Studies; Investment Company Institute

Howell E. Jackson

Harvard Law School

Date Written: December 2, 2008


This article presents the second installment of an empirical investigation into regulatory competition in international securities markets. It contributes to the current debate about competitiveness of U.S. capital markets by offering an account of transatlantic capital raising practices at the height of technology boom of the 1990s and before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the corporate scandals that precipitated the Act. This article provides evidence that European issuers in the late 1990s were already turning away from U.S. public capital markets. While regulatory considerations appear to have played a role in that trend, even more important were the growing importance of private means of access of U.S. capital, the increased off-shore presence of U.S. institutional investors, and the relatively unsatisfactory trading performance of many foreign issuers that had gone to the trouble of obtaining U.S. public listings early in the 1990s. The picture of transatlantic capital raising presented in our survey suggests that the recent decline in competitiveness of U.S. capital markets may well be more a product of long-standing trends in global financial markets than a response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or other requirements of federal securities laws. We have supplemented our original analysis with a post-script from the vantage point of 2008 to draw connections between our findings and those of recent academic literature.

Keywords: securities regulation, international finance, securities offerings, cross-border listing, Rule 144A, American Depositary Receipts, capital markets competitiveness

Suggested Citation

Pan, Eric J. and Jackson, Howell Edmunds, Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe - Part II (December 2, 2008). Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 247, Virginia Law & Business Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 207, 2008, Available at SSRN:

Eric J. Pan (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Center for Law and Economic Studies ( email )

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Investment Company Institute ( email )

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Howell Edmunds Jackson

Harvard Law School ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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617-495-5156 (Fax)

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