Contracts as Threats: On a Rationale for Rewarding A While Hoping for B

28 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2009

See all articles by Elisabetta Iossa

Elisabetta Iossa

University of Rome Tor Vergata; IEFE Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Giancarlo Spagnolo

University of Rome Tor Vergata; EIEF; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)

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Date Written: December 18, 2008

Abstract

In this paper we explore theoretically the relationship between explicit and implicit/relational contracting distinguishing between the ex-ante decision to sign an explicit contract and the ex-post decision whether to actually apply it. We show, among other things, that the relational efficient explicit contract tends to display overcontracting on tasks or qualitative requirements (A) that are verifiable but apparently of little use for the principal. The ex-post (non)implementation of such explicit contract can then be discretionally exchanged against the provision of non contractible tasks (B) that are highly valuable for the principal. An empirical implication of the result, consistent with casual observation in procurement, is that penalties for infringements established by explicit contracts are seldom exercised, even though violations take place and are easy to monitor and verify.

Keywords: Relational Contracting, Overcontracting

JEL Classification: D86, L14, L20, L32

Suggested Citation

Iossa, Elisabetta and Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Contracts as Threats: On a Rationale for Rewarding A While Hoping for B (December 18, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1325150 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1325150

Elisabetta Iossa (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

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IEFE Bocconi University ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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Giancarlo Spagnolo

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

Faculty of Economics - DEF
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Italy

EIEF ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) ( email )

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