The Role of the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Duopoly in the American Housing Market

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 17, 2009

Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 144

15 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2009

See all articles by David J. Reiss

David J. Reiss

Cornell University - Law School; Cornell University - Cornell Tech NYC

Date Written: April 16, 2009

Abstract

This article provides a brief introduction to the role of the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac duopoly in the American housing market. First, it defines the “government sponsored enterprise,” which is the type of hybrid public/private entity that Fannie and Freddie are and provides an introduction to the other significant GSEs. It then explains what Fannie and Freddie do in the American mortgage market and provides a brief history of how the two companies developed. Finally, it evaluates the two companies as duopolists in the conforming mortgage market and concludes that the current financial crisis presents an opportunity to rethink whether the Fannie/Freddie duopoly continues to serve the public interest.

Keywords: Fannie, Freddie, duopoly, monopoly, antitrust, secondary mortgage market, housing finance, government-sponsored enterprise, GSE

Suggested Citation

Reiss, David J., The Role of the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Duopoly in the American Housing Market (April 16, 2009). Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 17, 2009, Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 144, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1387262

David J. Reiss (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Law School ( email )

Myron Taylor Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853-4901
United States

Cornell University - Cornell Tech NYC ( email )

2 West Loop Rd.
New York, NY 10044
United States
7187910524 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
361
Abstract Views
2,050
Rank
179,287
PlumX Metrics