The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

36 Pages Posted: 20 Oct 2010

See all articles by Dan Kovenock

Dan Kovenock

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Brian Roberson

Purdue University - Department of Economics

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 19, 2010

Abstract

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerilla warfare” strategy — in which a single random target is attacked — more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets.

Keywords: Colonel Blotto, conflict resolution, weakest-link, best-shot, multi-dimensional resource allocation, experiments

JEL Classification: C72, C91, D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Kovenock, Daniel and Roberson, Brian and Sheremeta, Roman M., The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks (October 19, 2010). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3211. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1694437

Daniel Kovenock

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

One University Dr.
Orange, CA 92866
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Brian Roberson

Purdue University - Department of Economics ( email )

West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

Roman M. Sheremeta (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

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