Equity, Equality, or Need? Explaining Preferences towards Welfare Redistribution Principles across 23 European Countries
38 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2011 Last revised: 13 Aug 2011
Date Written: 2011
Abstract
Although the welfare state receives high levels of public support across European countries, insights into what kind of welfare state individuals prefer, i.e. one based on equity, equality or need, is scarce and fragmented. Using the 2008 wave of the European Social Survey, we analyze individual preferences of welfare redistribution departing from three assumptions. First, these preferences can only be properly understood in reference to specific welfare programs. Second, information of the national context is refined to see how these preferences relate to institutional, structural and cultural national information. Third, multilevel multinomial modeling is applied to assess the simultaneous association between individual and country-level determinants with these preferences. The results suggest that, when accounting for respondent characteristics, individuals prefer an equal redistribution of welfare, while preferences for alternatives of equity or need are mainly inspired by self-interest. Also, citizens of generous welfare states refrain from a preference for equity, while additional context associations are mixed.
Keywords: welfare state, redistribution principles, public opinion, multilevel analysis, European Social Survey
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
A Little Fairness May Induce a Lot of Redistribution in Democracy
-
Voting When Money and Morals Conflict: An Experimental Test of Expressive Voting
-
Social Identity and Preferences Over Redistribution
By Esteban F. Klor and Moses Shayo
-
Social Identity and Preferences Over Redistribution
By Esteban F. Klor and Moses Shayo
-
Moral Bias in Large Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence
By Timothy J. Feddersen, Sean Gailmard, ...
-
Preferences for Redistribution and Pensions: What can We Learn from Experiments?
-
Voters, Dictators, and Peons: Expressive Voting and Pivotality
By Emir Kamenica and Louisa Egan
-
By Moses Shayo and Alon Harel