Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

52 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2012 Last revised: 28 May 2013

See all articles by Martin G. Kocher

Martin G. Kocher

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics; Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance; University of Gothenburg - School of Business, Economics and Law; Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance

Kristian Ove R. Myrseth

University of York

Peter Martinsson

University of Gothenburg - Department of Economics and Statistics

Conny E. Wollbrant

University of Gothenburg - School of Business, Economics and Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 28, 2013

Abstract

We develop a model that relates self-control and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. As predicted, we find in a laboratory public goods experiment a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation. This means that there is evidence for an impulse to be selfish and that cooperative behavior requires self-control effort. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.

Keywords: self-control, cooperation, public good, risk, experiment

JEL Classification: C91, D03, H40

Suggested Citation

Kocher, Martin G. and Myrseth, Kristian Ove R. and Martinsson, Peter and Wollbrant, Conny E., Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas (March 28, 2013). ESMT Working Paper No. 12-01 (R1), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1988286 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1988286

Martin G. Kocher

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany

Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

Stumpergasse 56
A-1060 Vienna, A-1060
Austria

University of Gothenburg - School of Business, Economics and Law ( email )

Vasagatan 1
Goteborg, 40530
Sweden

Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

GPO Box 2434
2 George Street
Brisbane, Queensland 4001
Australia

Kristian Ove R. Myrseth (Contact Author)

University of York ( email )

Sally Baldwin Buildings
Heslington
York, North Yorkshire YO10 5DD
United Kingdom

Peter Martinsson

University of Gothenburg - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Box 640
Vasagatan 1, E-building, floor 5 & 6
Göteborg, 40530
Sweden

Conny E. Wollbrant

University of Gothenburg - School of Business, Economics and Law ( email )

Vasagatan 1
Goteborg, 40530
Sweden

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
179
Abstract Views
1,207
rank
160,192
PlumX Metrics