Fairness Spillovers – The Case of Taxation

29 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2012

See all articles by Thomas Cornelissen

Thomas Cornelissen

University College London

Oliver Himmler

University of Göttingen - Department of Economics; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Tobias König

University of Hannover

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 20, 2011

Abstract

It is standardly assumed that individuals react to perceived unfairness or norm violations in precisely the same area or relationship where the original offense has occurred. However, grievances over being exposed to injustice may have even broader consequences and also spill over to other contexts, causing non-compliant behavior there. We present evidence that such 'fairness spillovers' can incur large economic costs: A belief that there is unfairness in taxation in the sense that the rich don't pay enough taxes is associated with a twenty percent higher level of paid absenteeism from work.

Keywords: fairness, Beliefs, Taxation, Work Morale

JEL Classification: D63, H26, H31

Suggested Citation

Cornelissen, Thomas and Himmler, Oliver and König, Tobias, Fairness Spillovers – The Case of Taxation (November 20, 2011). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2012/17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2132503 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2132503

Thomas Cornelissen

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Oliver Himmler (Contact Author)

University of Göttingen - Department of Economics ( email )

Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3
Goettingen, 37073
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/dr-oliver-himmler/480040.html

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt Schumacher Str 10
Bonn, 53113
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.coll.mpg.de/team/page/oliver_himmler

Tobias König

University of Hannover ( email )

Koenigsworther Platz 1
30167 Hannover, DE 30167
Germany

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