Lie-Detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence

44 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2012  

Frederick Schauer

University of Virginia School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 31, 2012

Abstract

This paper, prepared for the “State of the Art” Law and Neuroscience Conference at the Rutgers (Camden) University School of Law, has two goals. One is to describe comprehensively the current court cases, scientific research, academic literature, and controversies about the potential use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) for detecting deception in court and other forensic contexts. The other is to suggest that the question of the admissibility of fMRI deception evidence in court cannot be thought of as being an exclusively scientific question. The appropriate use or non-use of science in the legal system involves inevitably normative questions about the appropriate levels of accuracy, reliability and validity, questions that must be answered in light of the goals of the legal system and the particular purposes to which the science would be put. The answers require getting the science right, and thus require the involvement of science and scientists, but the ultimate question of when and how the scientific conclusions so produced will be used is a question of legal policy as to which neither scientists nor lawyers should be given exclusive authority.

Suggested Citation

Schauer, Frederick, Lie-Detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence (August 31, 2012). Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2012-49. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2139508

Frederick Schauer (Contact Author)

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
434-924-6777 (Phone)

Paper statistics

Downloads
227
Rank
42,417
Abstract Views
948