Security of Property as a Public Good: Institutions, Socio-Political Environment and Experimental Behavior in Five Countries

74 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2012

See all articles by Francisco Campos-Ortiz

Francisco Campos-Ortiz

Bank of Mexico - Economic Research Department

Louis Putterman

Brown University - Department of Economics

T. K. Ahn

Seoul National University - Department of Political Science and International Relations

Loukas Balafoutas

University of Innsbruck

Mongoljin Batsaikhan

Middlesex University - Economics Department

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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Date Written: November 27, 2012

Abstract

We study experimentally the protection of property in five widely distinct countries - Austria, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea and the United States. Our main results are that the security of property varies with experimental institutions, and that our subject pools exhibit significantly different behaviors that correlate with country-level property security, trust and quality of government. Subjects from countries with higher levels of trust or perceptions of safety are more prone to abstain initially from theft and devote more resources to production, and subjects from countries with higher quality political institutions are more supportive of protecting property through compulsory taxation. This highlights the relevance of socio-political factors in determining countries’ success in addressing collective action problems including safeguarding property rights.

Keywords: property rights, theft, efficiency, experiment, socio-political factors

JEL Classification: C910, C920, D030, H410, P140

Suggested Citation

Campos-Ortiz, Francisco and Putterman, Louis G. and Ahn, T. K. and Balafoutas, Loukas and Batsaikhan, Mongoljin and Sutter, Matthias, Security of Property as a Public Good: Institutions, Socio-Political Environment and Experimental Behavior in Five Countries (November 27, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2181356 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2181356

Francisco Campos-Ortiz

Bank of Mexico - Economic Research Department ( email )

Av. 5 de Mayo 18
Piso 4
Mexico City, 06059
Mexico

Louis G. Putterman

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Box B
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-3837 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

T. K. Ahn

Seoul National University - Department of Political Science and International Relations ( email )

Kwanak-gu
Seoul, 151-742
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Loukas Balafoutas

University of Innsbruck ( email )

Universitätsstraße 15
Innsbruck, Innsbruck 6020
Austria

Mongoljin Batsaikhan

Middlesex University - Economics Department ( email )

The Burroughs
London, NW4 4BT
United Kingdom

Matthias Sutter (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

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