Inferring the True Likelihood of Task Completion by Others

EC’13, June 2013

16 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2013

See all articles by Jing Wang

Jing Wang

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology

Christina Aperjis

Hewlett-Packard Enterprise - Social Computing Lab

Bernardo A. Huberman

Stanford University

Date Written: February 11, 2013

Abstract

Both in online labor markets and within enterprises, a worker often has better information than his employer about the likelihood of completing a task or project on time. This information asymmetry prevents managers from having accurate estimates of project completion times. We design and experimentally test an incentive mechanism which induces workers to reveal their true likelihoods of completion times while minimizing the expected payments by the employers. Our results show that our mechanism performs very well at the aggregate level.

Suggested Citation

Wang, Jing and Aperjis, Christina and Huberman, Bernardo A., Inferring the True Likelihood of Task Completion by Others (February 11, 2013). EC’13, June 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2215108

Jing Wang

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology ( email )

Lee Shau Kee Business Building
Clearwater Bay
Kowloon
Hong Kong

HOME PAGE: http://www.bm.ust.hk/isom/faculty-and-staff/directory/jwang

Christina Aperjis

Hewlett-Packard Enterprise - Social Computing Lab ( email )

1501 Page Mill Road
Palo Alto, CA 9434
United States

Bernardo A. Huberman (Contact Author)

Stanford University ( email )

Palo Alto, CA 94305
United States

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