Privacy Protection, Personalized Medicine and Genetic Testing

52 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2014 Last revised: 16 Dec 2017

See all articles by Amalia R. Miller

Amalia R. Miller

University of Virginia - Department of Economics

Catherine E. Tucker

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Management Science (MS)

Date Written: May 25, 2017

Abstract

This paper explores how state genetic privacy laws affect the diffusion of personalized medicine, using data on genetic testing for cancer risks. State genetic privacy regimes employ and combine up to three alternative approaches to protecting patient privacy: Rules requiring that an individual is notified about potential privacy risks; rules restricting discriminatory usage of genetic data by employers or insurance companies; and rules limiting redisclosure without the consent of the individual. We find empirically that approaches to genetic and health privacy that give users control over redisclosure encourage the spread of genetic testing, but that notification deters individuals from obtaining genetic tests. We present some evidence that the latter reflects costs imposed on the supply of genetic testing by hospitals. We find no effects of state genetic anti-discrimination laws on genetic testing rates.

Keywords: Privacy, Genetic Testing, Privacy Regulation, Applied Economics, Innovation

Suggested Citation

Miller, Amalia R. and Tucker, Catherine E., Privacy Protection, Personalized Medicine and Genetic Testing (May 25, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2411230 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2411230

Amalia R. Miller

University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
United States

HOME PAGE: http://people.virginia.edu/~am5by/

Catherine E. Tucker (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Management Science (MS) ( email )

100 Main St
E62-536
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

HOME PAGE: http://cetucker.scripts.mit.edu

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
386
rank
71,296
Abstract Views
1,792
PlumX Metrics