Intentions Undercover -- Hiding Intentions is Considered Unfair

34 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 2015

See all articles by Tim Friehe

Tim Friehe

University of Konstanz - Department of Economics

Verena Utikal

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg-Friedrich Alexander Universität Erlangen Nürnberg

Date Written: February 27, 2015

Abstract

Unfair intentions provoke negative reciprocity from others, making their concealment potentially beneficial. This paper explores whether people hide their unfair intentions from others and how hiding intentions is itself perceived in fairness terms. Our experimental data show a high frequency of cover-up attempts and that affected parties punish the concealment of intentions, establishing that people consider not only unkind intentions but also hiding intentions unfair. When choosing whether or not to hide intentions, subjects trade-off the lower expected punishment when the cover up of unfair intentions is successful against the higher expected punishment when cover up is unsuccessful. In an attempt to better understand fairness perceptions, we present a typology of punisher types and show that hiding unkind intentions is treated differently than unkind intentions, possibly establishing a behavioral category of its own.

Keywords: intentions, reciprocity, fairness, avoidance, cover up, experiment

JEL Classification: C90, D01, K42

Suggested Citation

Friehe, Tim and Utikal, Verena, Intentions Undercover -- Hiding Intentions is Considered Unfair (February 27, 2015). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5218, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576161 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2576161

Tim Friehe (Contact Author)

University of Konstanz - Department of Economics ( email )

Konstanz, D-78457
Germany

Verena Utikal

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg-Friedrich Alexander Universität Erlangen Nürnberg ( email )

Schloßplatz 4
Erlangen, DE Bavaria 91054
Germany

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