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Are Payoff Maximisers More Cooperative? Evidence from a Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment

10 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2016 Last revised: 25 Oct 2017

Maria Kozlovskaya

Aston University

Date Written: October 24, 2017

Abstract

Subjects who played a payoff-maximising strategy against a computer algorithm ("sophisticates") are more cooperative in a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma than subjects who did not play a payoff-maximising strategy ("naifs"). The difference in cooperation rates increases as the subjects gain experience with the game. As a result, sophisticates earn more than naifs, when paired with players of their own type. This finding implies that cooperation in the game is not a result of reasoning fault.

Keywords: Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Strategic Sophistication, Bounded Rationality

JEL Classification: C72, C73, C91

Suggested Citation

Kozlovskaya, Maria, Are Payoff Maximisers More Cooperative? Evidence from a Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment (October 24, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2755062 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2755062

Maria Kozlovskaya (Contact Author)

Aston University ( email )

Aston Triangle
Birmingham, B4 7ET
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.mariakozlovskaya.com

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