Do the Right Thing: Experimental Evidence that Preferences for Moral Behavior, Rather Than Equity or Efficiency per se, Drive Human Prosociality

Forthcoming in Judgment and Decision Making

24 Pages Posted: 10 May 2017 Last revised: 12 Jan 2018

See all articles by Valerio Capraro

Valerio Capraro

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Psychology

David G. Rand

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Date Written: January 11, 2018

Abstract

Decades of experimental research show that some people forgo personal gains to benefit others in unilateral anonymous interactions. To explain these results, behavioral economists typically assume that people have social preferences for minimizing inequality and/or maximizing efficiency (social welfare). Here we present data that are incompatible with these standard social preference models. We use a “Trade-Off Game” (TOG), where players unilaterally choose between an equitable option and an efficient option. We show that simply changing the labelling of the options to describe the equitable versus efficient option as morally right completely reverses the correlation between behavior in the TOG and play in a separate Dictator Game (DG) or Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD): people who take the action framed as moral in the TOG, be it equitable or efficient, are much more prosocial in the DG and PD. Rather than preferences for equity and/or efficiency per se, our results suggest that prosociality in games such as the DG and PD are driven by a generalized morality preference that motivates people to do what they think is morally right.

Keywords: Cooperation, Altruism, Prosocial Behavior, Moral Behavior, Social Preferences

JEL Classification: C70, C71, C72, D01, D03, D63, D64

Suggested Citation

Capraro, Valerio and Rand, David G., Do the Right Thing: Experimental Evidence that Preferences for Moral Behavior, Rather Than Equity or Efficiency per se, Drive Human Prosociality (January 11, 2018). Forthcoming in Judgment and Decision Making, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2965067 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2965067

Valerio Capraro

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Psychology ( email )

David G. Rand (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

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