Media Competition, Information Provision and Political Participation: Evidence from French Local Newspapers and Elections, 1944-2014

62 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2017

See all articles by Julia Cage

Julia Cage

Sciences Po Paris Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2017

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of increased media competition on the quantity and quality of news provided and, ultimately, on political participation. Drawing upon existing literature on vertical product differentiation, I explore the conditions under which an increase in the number of newspapers can decrease both the quantity and quality of news provided. I build a new county-level panel dataset of local newspaper presence, newspapers' newsrooms, costs and revenues and political turnout in France, from 1944 to 2014. I estimate the effect of newspaper entry by comparing counties that experience entry to similar counties in the same years that do not. Both sets of counties exhibit similar trends prior to newspaper entry, but those with entry experience substantial declines in the average number of journalists (business-stealing effect). An increased number of newspapers is also associated with fewer articles and less hard news provision. These effects are stronger in counties with more homogeneous populations, as predicted by my simple theoretical framework, whereas there is little impact in counties with more heterogeneous populations. Newspaper entry, and the associated decline in information provision, is ultimately found to decrease voter turnout at local elections.

Keywords: media competition, newspaper content, size of the newsroom, hard news, soft news, political participation

JEL Classification: D72, L11, L13, L82

Suggested Citation

Cage, Julia, Media Competition, Information Provision and Political Participation: Evidence from French Local Newspapers and Elections, 1944-2014 (July 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3012120 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3012120

Julia Cage (Contact Author)

Sciences Po Paris Department of Economics ( email )

28 Rue des Saints-Pères
Paris, 75007
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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