How Do Platform Participants Respond to an Unfair Rating? An Analysis of a Ride-Sharing Platform Using a Quasi-Experiment

36 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2017

See all articles by Anuj Kapoor

Anuj Kapoor

University of Utah

Catherine E. Tucker

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Management Science (MS)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 24, 2017

Abstract

Online rating systems can lead, on occasion, to reviews that are unfair or un-representative of the true quality provided. On the one hand, receiving an unfairly low rating once, might induce someone a platform supplier to exert more effort and receive a better rating the next time. On the other hand, it might dispirit suppliers and make them exert less effort. We use data from a ride-sharing platform in India where driver ratings were made particularly salient to the driver after each trip. Our data suggests that if a customer experiences a ride cancellation, they are more likely to unfairly blame the replacement driver. We use this as a exogenous source of unfair negative ratings for the driver. We show that drivers are more likely to respond negatively to a bad rating and receive subsequently bad ratings if they were blameless for the previous negative rating. This effect is larger in contexts where there is a higher potential for an emotional response and when there is a greater need for driver skill in the subsequent ride.

Keywords: The Sharing Economy, User Generated Content, Ratings

JEL Classification: L86, M37

Suggested Citation

Kapoor, Anuj and Tucker, Catherine E., How Do Platform Participants Respond to an Unfair Rating? An Analysis of a Ride-Sharing Platform Using a Quasi-Experiment (October 24, 2017). NET Institute Working Paper No. 17-19, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3061385 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3061385

Anuj Kapoor (Contact Author)

University of Utah ( email )

UT
United States

Catherine E. Tucker

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Management Science (MS) ( email )

100 Main St
E62-536
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

HOME PAGE: http://cetucker.scripts.mit.edu

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