Disclosure Regulation in the Commercial Banking Industry: Lessons From the National Banking Era

Posted: 5 May 2018

See all articles by Joao Granja

Joao Granja

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 1, 2018

Abstract

I exploit variation in the adoption of disclosure and supervisory regulation across U.S. states to examine their impact on the development and stability of commercial banks. The empirical results suggest that the adoption of state‐level requirements to report financial statements in local newspapers is associated with greater stability and development of commercial banks. I also examine which political constituencies influence the adoption of disclosure and supervisory regulation. I find that powerful landowners and small private banks are associated with late adoption of these regulations. These findings suggest that incumbent groups oppose disclosure rules because the passage of such rules threatens their private interests.

Keywords: Disclosure Regulation; Bank Regulation; Enforcement; FInancial Stability; Bank Failures; FInancial Development; Political Economy of Regulation

JEL Classification: E44; E51; G21; G28; G32; G38; H23; K22; K23; L51; M41; M48;N11; N21; N41; N81

Suggested Citation

Granja, Joao, Disclosure Regulation in the Commercial Banking Industry: Lessons From the National Banking Era (March 1, 2018). Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3165656

Joao Granja (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Room 326
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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