Social Preferences and Social Curiosity

36 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2018

See all articles by Weiwei Tasch

Weiwei Tasch

University of Pennsylvania - School of Arts & Sciences

Daniel Houser

Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 03, 2018

Abstract

Over the last two decades social preferences have been implicated in a wide variety of key economic behaviors. Here we investigate connections between social preferences and the demand for information about others’ economic decisions and outcomes, which we denote “social curiosity.” Our analysis is within the context of the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Using data from laboratory experiments with sequential public goods games, we estimate social preferences at the individual level, and then correlate social preferences with one’s willingness to pay to make visible others’ contribution decisions. Our investigation enables us to shed light on how costs to knowing others’ economic decisions and outcomes impact decisions among people with different social preferences, and in particular the extent to which such costs impact the willingness for groups to cooperate.

Keywords: laboratory experiment, curiosity, inequality aversion, sequential public goods game

JEL Classification: C910, B830, H410

Suggested Citation

Tasch, Weiwei and Houser, Daniel, Social Preferences and Social Curiosity (July 03, 2018). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7132, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3235299 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3235299

Weiwei Tasch

University of Pennsylvania - School of Arts & Sciences ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Daniel Houser (Contact Author)

Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science ( email )

5th Floor, Vernon Smith Hall
George Mason University
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
7039934856 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~dhouser/

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