Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis

24 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2003

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: December 2002

Abstract

Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.

Keywords: Altruism, Envy, Contests, Evolutionary Stability

JEL Classification: C72, D64, D74

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A., Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis (December 2002). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 825, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=367460

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

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Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

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Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Bonn, 53072
Germany

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