CFO Narcissism and the Power of Persuasion Over Analysts: A Mixed-Methods Approach

61 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2023 Last revised: 22 Nov 2024

See all articles by Charles (Chad) Ham

Charles (Chad) Ham

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business

Mark Piorkowski

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business

Nicholas Seybert

University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance

Sean Wang

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Accounting Department

Date Written: November 21, 2024

Abstract

We study the role of CFO narcissism in the intent and ability to positively influence sell-side analysts’ perceptions of the firm. Consistent with narcissists casting favorable impressions on others, we find CFO narcissism is associated with overly optimistic analyst valuations. Analyses of conference call transcripts reveal that narcissistic CFOs exhibit greater analyst engagement—especially with bearish analysts—and use more optimistic language, argumentative prose, and corporate euphemisms, suggesting attempts at persuasion in public settings. We also provide evidence that these public persuasion tactics contribute to optimistic analyst valuations. We then use a laboratory study to simulate a private communication channel and find that narcissists are more likely to use persuasion methods that involve directly pressuring analysts (e.g., threatening to remove private lines of communication with management) to induce higher valuations. Collectively, we provide evidence that narcissistic CFOs exercise persuasion tactics to favorably influence analysts’ perceptions of firm value. 

Keywords: Executive Narcissism, Persuasion, Sell-Side Analysts

JEL Classification: G24, G30, G41

Suggested Citation

Ham, Charles and Piorkowski, Mark and Seybert, Nicholas and Wang, Sean, CFO Narcissism and the Power of Persuasion Over Analysts: A Mixed-Methods Approach (November 21, 2024). SMU Cox School of Business Research Paper No. 23-11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4506020 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4506020

Charles Ham (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business ( email )

1309 East Tenth Street
Indianapolis, IN 47405-1701
United States

Mark Piorkowski

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business ( email )

1309 E 10th Street, Hodge Hall 4100
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

Nicholas Seybert

University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance ( email )

Robert H. Smith School of Business
College Park, MD 20742-9157
United States

Sean Wang

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Accounting Department ( email )

United States
2147682858 (Phone)

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