The Joint Effect of Pay Range Disclosure Width and Gender on Job Applications

60 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2023 Last revised: 3 Jan 2024

See all articles by Darren Bernard

Darren Bernard

University of Washington - Department of Accounting

Joe Croom

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

Benjamin Yang

University of Washington - Department of Accounting

Date Written: August 30, 2023

Abstract

We use a laboratory experiment to examine how the width of the pay range that companies disclose on job postings affects the application decisions of men versus women. While pay range disclosures are intended to help reduce pay inequities such as the gender wage gap, we predict and find that when companies widen the pay range disclosed in a job posting, they deter women more than men from applying in the first place. Results from both between-subjects and within-subjects tests show women are significantly less willing to apply to a job with a wide relative to narrow pay range, while men appear indifferent between a wide and narrow pay range. Path analysis suggests that perception of pay inequity is a primary channel through which the effect operates. Our findings have important implications for regulators considering implementing or amending pay disclosure laws and for companies navigating the emerging pay disclosure landscape.

Keywords: pay transparency, disclosure, job search, gender, diversity, equity

JEL Classification: C91, J01, J16, J24, J30, J70, M12, M14, M40, M41, M50, M52, M54

Suggested Citation

Bernard, Darren and Croom, Joe and Yang, Benjamin, The Joint Effect of Pay Range Disclosure Width and Gender on Job Applications (August 30, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4546369 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4546369

Darren Bernard

University of Washington - Department of Accounting ( email )

PACCAR Hall
4273 E Stevens Way NE
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States

Joe Croom

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )

Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States
5178980509 (Phone)

Benjamin Yang (Contact Author)

University of Washington - Department of Accounting ( email )

Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States

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