Work Hours Mismatch

106 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2024 Last revised: 7 May 2025

See all articles by Marta Lachowska

Marta Lachowska

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; Stockholm University - Department of Economics

Alexandre Mas

Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section

Raffaele Saggio

University of British Columbia (UBC)

Stephen Woodbury

Michigan State University; W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Using a revealed preference approach applied to administrative data from Washington we document that workers have limited discretion over hours at a given employer, there is substantial mismatch between workers who prefer long hours and employers that provide short hours, and hour constraints are prevalent. Voluntary job transitions imply that a ratio of the marginal rate of substitution of earnings for hours to the wage rate is on the order of 0.5-0.6 for prime-age workers. The average absolute deviation between observed and optimal hours is about 15%, and constraints on hours are particularly acute among low-wage workers. On average, observed hours tend to be less than preferred levels, and workers would require a 12% higher wage with their current employer to be as well off as they would be after moving to an employer offering ideal hours. These findings suggest that hour constraints are an equilibrium feature of the labor market because long-hour jobs are costly to employers.

Keywords: hour constraints, mismatch, sorting, labor supply, willingness to pay, wage premiums, hour policies

JEL Classification: J22, J23, J31, J40

Suggested Citation

Lachowska, Marta and Mas, Alexandre and Saggio, Raffaele and Woodbury, Stephen, Work Hours Mismatch. IZA Discussion Paper No. 17363, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4990289

Marta Lachowska (Contact Author)

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research ( email )

300 South Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.upjohn.org/AboutUs/Staff/Lachowska

Stockholm University - Department of Economics ( email )

Stockholm University
Stockholm, 10691
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://www2.sofi.su.se/~mla/

Alexandre Mas

Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-2098
United States

Raffaele Saggio

University of British Columbia (UBC) ( email )

2329 West Mall
Vancouver, British Columbia BC V6T 1Z4
Canada

Stephen Woodbury

Michigan State University ( email )

East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-4587 (Phone)
517-432-1068 (Fax)

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research ( email )

300 South Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
United States
269-343-5541 (Phone)

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