ESG Ratings and Share Repurchases: Examining the Tension between Stakeholder and Shareholder Priorities

42 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2025

See all articles by Theo Vermaelen

Theo Vermaelen

INSEAD - Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Sterling Huang

New York University (NYU) - New York University (NYU), Shanghai

Shuo Li

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Kaisa Snellman

INSEAD - Organisational Behavior

Abstract

We find that companies with high ESG ratings are less likely to announce share repurchase programs. This effect is most significant for the E component consistent with the view that firms that buy back shares signal that they care more about shareholders than the environment.. We find that there is no clear significant consistent relation between ESG and equity issues, dividend increases, or mergers and acquisitions. However, high ESG companies will announce buybacks when they are heavily undervalued, suggesting that these firms are less concerned about “doing good” when the financial returns of “doing bad” are large.

Keywords: Buyback, ESG

Suggested Citation

Vermaelen, Theo and Huang, Sterling and Li, Shuo and Snellman, Kaisa, ESG Ratings and Share Repurchases: Examining the Tension between Stakeholder and Shareholder Priorities. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5100333 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5100333

Theo Vermaelen (Contact Author)

INSEAD - Finance ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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Belgium

Sterling Huang

New York University (NYU) - New York University (NYU), Shanghai ( email )

1555 Century Ave
Shanghai, Shanghai 200122
China

Shuo Li

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Kaisa Snellman

INSEAD - Organisational Behavior ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
Fontainebleau 77305
France

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