Wages, Employment, and Capital in Capitalist and Worker-Owned Firms

46 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2006 Last revised: 7 May 2025

See all articles by John H. Pencavel

John H. Pencavel

Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Luigi Pistaferri

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Stanford University

Fabiano Schivardi

Luiss Guido Carli - Department of Economics and Finance; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Abstract

Differences in wages, employment, and capital between worker-owned and capitalist enterprises are computed from a matched employer-worker panel data set from Italy, the market economy with the greatest incidence of worker-owned and worker-managed firms. These differences are related to orthodox models of the capitalist firm and worker co-op. The estimates of the wage, employment, and capital equations largely corroborate the implications of the behavioral models of the two types of enterprise. Co-op wages are about 14 percent lower on average and they are more volatile (and employment less volatile) than those in capitalist enterprises. Given the breadth of the data set analyzed, the results can claim to constitute general findings about capitalist and co-op enterprises.

Keywords: wages, capitalist firms, worker-owned firms, employment, capital

JEL Classification: J54, D21, L21

Suggested Citation

Pencavel, John H. and Pistaferri, Luigi and Pistaferri, Luigi and Schivardi, Fabiano, Wages, Employment, and Capital in Capitalist and Worker-Owned Firms. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2188, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=919920

John H. Pencavel (Contact Author)

Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) ( email )

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Luigi Pistaferri

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
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Stanford University ( email )

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Fabiano Schivardi

Luiss Guido Carli - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

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Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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