What Counts as Racism? American Norms, Partisan Norms, and Personal Beliefs About Racism

Abstract

Americans may agree that racism is wrong in theory, but do they agree on what counts as racism in practice? We examine this question by asking Americans not just about their personal beliefs, but also their expectations about what either their fellow Americans or their fellow partisans believe. This allows us to determine whether distinct norms for usage of the term racism have emerged within the two parties. Using national surveys, we find that partisans only agree that examples of explicit racism constitute racism, reporting polarized beliefs over the validity of other well-known conceptualizations: institutional racism, subtle racism, and colorblind racism. Using incentivized coordination games within our surveys, we demonstrate there are distinct normative expectations within partisan groups but not within the broader American public. Experimentally priming partisan norms causes further polarization of personal beliefs, suggesting they are injunctive, and attempting to prime American norms leads to backlash.

Keywords: racism, norms, identity, partisanship